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* docs(sentinel): design — inline IOC gate + async Go analyzer + spyware packs (ref #823) * docs(sentinel): implementation plan — 12 tasks (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): IOC model + IOCSet matchers (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): pack loader + live-overlay merge + hot-reload (ref #823) Add internal/sentinel/pack.go: Pack (JSON base/overlay content bundle), LoadBasePack, MergePacks (base + N overlays, override by Type+Value via IOCSet's per-type maps), and Loader (NewLoader/Set/MaybeReload/YaraRules). Loader mirrors cmd/sbxmitm/policy.go's LoadPolicy/maybeReload mtime-based hot-reload pattern, adapted for a directory of a DYNAMIC *.json file set (glob-based) rather than policy.go's fixed Target list. Fail-safe: a corrupt overlay pack is skipped+logged, never wipes the base or panics; MaybeReload is a cheap stat-only no-op when nothing on disk changed; Set()/YaraRules() read via atomic.Pointer so a reload swap never torn-reads a concurrent hot-path lookup. Adds JSON tags to Task 1's IOC struct (type/value/class/severity/source/ action) so packs round-trip through encoding/json. * fix(sentinel): pack loader — fail-closed on base-wipe + throttle MaybeReload + url_regex override + yara dedup (ref #823) Review found 1 Critical + 2 Important + 1 Minor in Task 2 (pack loader): - Critical: a vanished/degraded base pack directory (deleted dir, mount blip, mid-dpkg-upgrade window) could silently empty the live detection set on the next MaybeReload. loaderState now tracks baseCount; a reload that would drop base IOCs from >0 to 0 is refused (prior state kept, warning logged) instead of swapped in. - Important: MaybeReload() is called per-flow by Task 3's inline gate: add a 5s default throttle (mirrors cmd/sbxmitm/policy.go's reloadThrottle) so a hot-path call is a pure no-op until the window elapses. - Important: url_regex IOCs previously only appended, so a live overlay could never override a base pack's URL rule (base always matched first). Add urlIndex (pattern -> slice index) so re-adding the same pattern replaces the entry in place, keeping deterministic match order. - Minor: YaraRules() now dedups identical rule bodies across base+overlay packs instead of emitting duplicates. go test ./internal/sentinel/: 21/21 PASS. go vet/gofmt/go build clean. * feat(sentinel): inline gate matcher (fail-open, highest-severity) (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): bbolt verdict store (pure-Go, WAL-free, TTL prune) (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): action scorer — heuristic/low-confidence forced report-only (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): bounded fire-and-forget mirror channel (drop-with-count) (ref #823) * fix(sentinel): mirror Emit always copies body — no aliasing of caller's hot-path buffer (ref #823) * feat(sbxmitm): inline Sentinel gate — neutralize high-confidence, mirror rest, fail-open (ref #823) Wire internal/sentinel's inline IOC gate into the shared mitmPipeline response path (covers both the transparent R3 and CONNECT accept paths without drift): build a FlowMeta from Host/URL/ClientIP/MacHash after up.Do, call the gate, and on a HIGH-CONFIDENCE known-infra hit neutralize inline — block/sinkhole serve a Sentinel block page instead of the upstream response, strip serves the response with an emptied body. Everything else (miss, heuristic, low-confidence, report) is mirrored bounded fire-and-forget to the async analyzer and proceeds unchanged. Fail-open everywhere: SENTINEL_ENABLED unset/false, a pack-load failure, a nil hook, or a gate panic all degrade to a transparent passthrough — a Sentinel setup problem can never break browsing. With the engine off, behavior is byte-identical to today. Env: SENTINEL_ENABLED / SENTINEL_PACK_DIR / SENTINEL_OVERLAY_DIR / SENTINEL_MIRROR_SOCK. Hot path (BenchmarkSentinelInspectMiss, -benchmem): 101.0 ns/op, 0 B/op, 0 allocs/op — one throttled gate Match + a non-blocking mirror Emit; no YARA or heavy analysis inline. go test ./cmd/sbxmitm/... -race → ok (all pre-existing + 7 new green). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(sentinel): sbx-sentinel async daemon scaffold + store wiring (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): YARA engine (cgo, build-tagged) + no-cgo stub (ref #823) Add internal/sentinel/yara.go (cgo && yara) wrapping github.com/hillu/go-yara/v4 for compiled-rule body scanning, and yara_stub.go (!yara) as the no-op default: NewYaraEngine always succeeds, Scan/Analyze always return nil. Both expose identical signatures (YaraEngine, NewYaraEngine, Scan, Analyze, Close) so sbx-sentinel/sbxmitm can wire a YaraEngine unconditionally. yara_test.go (untagged) proves the default build works with YARA disabled. yara_real_test.go (yara tag) compiles a trivial EICAR rule and exercises the real libyara-backed engine — split into its own file since Go build constraints are file-scoped and can't mix a tagged and untagged test in one file. go-yara is now an indirect go.mod requirement and vendored, but is only reachable via the yara build tag: default `go build ./...` and `CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./...` both stay clean, no libyara/cgo required. `-tags yara` needs libyara-dev + a C toolchain (documented in yara.go's header). * fix(sentinel): YARA verdict confidence 90 (>= threshold) so a confirmed malware match actually strips, not report-only (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): behavioral engine — beaconing + zero-click heuristics (report-only) (ref #823) * fix(sentinel): tighten one-time-link heuristic — exclude file-extension + base64 shapes (cut zero-click FPs) (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): spyware indicator engine + commercial-spyware base pack (MVT/CitizenLab) (ref #823) * fix(sentinel): base-pack declared-block IOCs severity>=85 so they actually block + general guard test (ref #823) Three shipped base-pack IOCs declared action:"block" but severity:80, below scorer.go's HighConfidenceThreshold=85 — FinalizeAction silently downgrades any Confidence below that threshold to report-only, so these entries never actually blocked despite being declared as known-bad: - packs/base/malware.json: ip 198.51.100.23 (class malware) - packs/base/malware.json: cert_sha1 ...01234567 (class trojan) - packs/base/botnet.json: ja3 deadbeef... (class botnet_c2) Bumped all three to severity 90 so they survive FinalizeAction and actually block, matching every other declared-block entry in the base packs. Added TestBasePackDeclaredBlockIsHighSeverity, a general guard over every base pack file/entry: any IOC with an auto-neutralize action (block/strip/sinkhole) must carry Severity >= HighConfidenceThreshold. This generalizes the narrower TestBasePackKnownInfraIsHighSeverity (spyware classes only) so a future pack entry in any class can't ship a "block" that silently never blocks. Confirmed the new test fails red against the pre-fix JSON (all 3 offenders reported) and passes green after the severity bump. * feat(sentinel): proposal/solution reporter — RenderReport(Verdict) (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): wire real analyzers into sbx-sentinel + read-only status HTTP surface (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): live threat-feed → overlay pack fetcher (fail-safe, atomic) (ref #823) * feat(sentinel): live feed overlay + reporter + daemon analyzer wiring + packaging (ref #823) * fix(sentinel): feeds fetcher — add curl --fail so HTTP 4xx/5xx is treated as a fetch failure (ref #823) * fix(sbxmitm): drop mis-wired ClientIP from inline Sentinel FlowMeta (source IP must not match destination-C2 IP IOCs) (ref #823) --------- Co-authored-by: CyberMind-FR <gandalf@Gk2.net> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|---|---|---|
| .claude | ||
| .gitea/workflows | ||
| .github | ||
| .superpowers | ||
| .vscode | ||
| apt | ||
| board | ||
| cache/repo | ||
| clients | ||
| cmd/secubox | ||
| common | ||
| config | ||
| daemon | ||
| docs | ||
| doctrine/opad | ||
| hardware | ||
| image | ||
| kernel-build | ||
| packages | ||
| profiles | ||
| prototypes | ||
| redroid | ||
| remote-ui | ||
| repo | ||
| schemas | ||
| scripts | ||
| templates | ||
| tests | ||
| tools | ||
| vm | ||
| wiki | ||
| .cache-lint-allowlist.toml | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| build-eye-remote-full.sh | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| HOWTO-grammar.md | ||
| LICENCE-CMSD-1.0.md | ||
| LICENSE-CMSD-1.0.en.md | ||
| LICENSING.md | ||
| PROMPT_SYSTEM.md | ||
| pytest.ini | ||
| README.md | ||
| REPORT-2026-04-10.md | ||
| secubox.conf.example | ||
| setup-dev.sh | ||
| TOOLS.md | ||
SecuBox
Your Network Security Appliance — Plug, Protect, Peace of Mind
📡 VILLAGE3B — Cabine Numérique Gondwana ToolBoX
Diagnostic compromission iPhone gratuit · Anonyme · Open Source
3 niveaux d'opt-in (R0 bypass complet, R1 analyse passive ✓ recommandée, R2 TLS-break + bandeau). Rapport téléchargeable avec 9 widgets metrics : 🌐 connexions · 📡 hôtes · ✅ OK 2xx · 🔒 cert-pinning · 📺 apps · 🍪 trackers · 🌍 pays · 🎯 score · 📱 device. Conformité CSPN ANSSI + LCEN. Aucune donnée externe.
- Détails techniques : docs/AI-HANDOVER-cabine-evolution.md
- Brief poster + variantes : docs/marketing/POSTER-grand-public-village3b.md
- Press kit + candidatures France.gouv : docs/marketing/PROMPT-claude-presse-gouv.md
- Issue tracking poster : #497
🕸️ Cartographie sociale — « You Have Been Tracked » (Phase 11)
Le même navigateur, reconnu de site en site.
En R3 consenti, la cabine corrèle les cookies tiers et les fingerprints JA4 par device pour révéler, en temps réel, quels acteurs commerciaux reconnaissent votre navigateur à travers les sites visités. Un relais ad-tech reliant 4 éditeurs (360yield + seedtag + smartadserver + smilewanted via la même IP) saute aux yeux dans le graphe force-dirigé.
- Vue per-client :
https://kbin.gk2.secubox.in/social/me(🕸️ « Ma carto »)- Graphe d3 plein écran (pan / pinch-zoom), évidence cross-site, effacement RGPD art. 17, rapport PDF bilingue (Phase 11.C).
- Anonyme :
mac_hashà sel rotatif 24h, aucune valeur de cookie brute persistée. Tout calculé localement.- Tableau opérateur :
admin.gk2.secubox.in/toolbox/#social.- Brief poster : docs/marketing/POSTER-you-have-been-tracked.md
- Plan + design lock : #502
🗡️ kbin — le premier outil du couteau suisse cyber
kbin (kbin.gk2.secubox.in) est le portail public de la ToolBoX SecuBox — la
cabine numérique et première lame du couteau suisse cyber modulaire de
cybermind.fr. On s'y branche, on surfe normalement, et la lame
inspecte et protège le trafic de façon transparente :
| 🗡️ | Lame |
|---|---|
| ⚡ | Performance transparente — on ne déchiffre que ce qu'on modifie (SNI-splice sélectif) |
| 🔒 | Full encrypted — inspection MITM complète, forge de cert par hôte, fingerprint Chrome uTLS |
| ☠️ | Injection de poison & smog — le trafic ad-tech ressort empoisonné, pas seulement bloqué |
| 🚫 | Bandeau anti-adware — transparence injectée, immune au CSP, SPA-aware |
| 🛡️ | Safe browsing — Vortex DNS + blacklist nft + détection anti-bot |
Prochaine lame — 🧅 mode Tor quick-switch (#683). Un tap → le surf ressort par le réseau Tor (egress sortant, pseudo-network) : l'inspection reste intacte, seule l'IP de sortie devient anonyme. Fail-closed, opt-in, sans fuite DNS.
- Use-case : docs/wiki/Kbin-Toolbox.md
- FAQ : docs/FAQ-KBIN-TOR.md
License — CyberMind Source-Disclosed (CMSD-1.0)
Source disclosed, rights reserved.
This software is released under the CyberMind Source-Disclosed License v1.0 — a source-available license designed for transparency and security auditability while preserving all commercial rights.
| What you CAN do | What you CANNOT do |
|---|---|
| Read and study the source code | Use in production (any environment) |
| Compile for isolated testing/audit | Redistribute or create derivatives |
| Publish security research results | Integrate into other products |
| Quote in academic/journalistic contexts | Provide as hosted service (SaaS) |
ANSSI CSPN Ready: The license explicitly authorizes audits by accredited security labs (CESTI, CC equivalents) without prior authorization.
See LICENCE-CMSD-1.0.md (French, authoritative) or LICENSE-CMSD-1.0.en.md (English, informative).
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
139 .deb packages |
|
| 131/139 modules migrated | |
| FastAPI + JWT auth | |
|  |
SecuBox transforms any compatible device into a complete network security appliance with VPN, firewall, intrusion detection, and web dashboard — all preconfigured and ready to use.
Status (2026-06-02) — Versioning is dev alpha. The current line (v2.13.x) is all-in-the-pipe working — partly efficient, partly modules-integration-ready, partly upgradeable, first-point POC. Design philosophy : KISS. SecuBox aims to be a full operating system for a security tool — a Swiss army knife + modular OS appliance. See the wiki Use-Cases page for scenario-by-scenario tweaks.
Latest Releases
v2.13.x — Main system line (2026-05-29 → ongoing)
The current release line. v2.13.4 unblocked the arm64 APT publish (chain #425 / #427 / #431). v2.13.10 produced the first working rpi400 kiosk image (chain #433 / #436). v2.13.11 mass-masks non-essential services so the kiosk boots on a 4 GB Pi 400 (#442). v2.13.12 enables the X cursor on the kiosk for salon-ready operator visibility (#444).
| Target | File | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| VirtualBox / QEMU / KVM (amd64) | secubox-vm-x64-bookworm.img.gz |
service cascade in VBox is a known limit, #422 |
| Live USB / amd64 PC | secubox-live-amd64-bookworm.img.gz |
validated in VBox, boots to kiosk login |
| MOCHAbin (Marvell Armada 7040) | secubox-mochabin-bookworm.img.gz |
primary appliance target |
| Raspberry Pi 400 / Pi 4 | secubox-rpi-arm64-bookworm.img.gz |
kiosk-by-default since v2.13.10 |
| Installer ISO (any amd64 host) | secubox-installer-amd64-bookworm.iso.gz |
dual format .iso + .img |
| APT repository | https://apt.secubox.in/ |
signed arm64 + amd64 since v2.13.4 |
| SHA256SUMS | SHA256SUMS |
verify every download |
All artefacts are attached to the latest release page — links above are illustrative ; the shield at the top of this section follows the latest stable tag automatically.
v2.2.1-eye-remote — Round display (2026-05-11)
Side-line image for the Pi Zero W round-display dashboard. Not part of the main v2.x.y line — refreshed independently when the kiosk stack moves.
| Target | Download |
|---|---|
| Pi Zero W + HyperPixel 2.1 Round | secubox-eye-remote-2.2.1.img.xz |
Verifying downloads
Every release attaches a SHA256SUMS file alongside the artifacts. Verify before flashing:
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS 2>&1 | grep -v 'OK$' || echo "all hashes match"
For the amd64 VirtualBox target there's a turn-key tester bundle under output/ci-vm-x64-25983593168/ — drop-in verify.sh + raw_to_vdi.py (no qemu-img/VBoxManage needed) + step-by-step README.md. Boot in 4 commands; see output/ci-vm-x64-25983593168/FIX-PXE.md if the VBox EFI ever lands on the PXE screen.
What You Get
- VPN Server — WireGuard with QR codes for mobile devices
- Intrusion Detection — CrowdSec IDS/IPS with automatic threat blocking
- WAF Active Enforcement — mitm pattern detection → CrowdSec →
nftkernel drop (~12s round-trip). Plus pre-mitm rate-limit (slowloris kill) and nginx honeypot routes. See wiki. - R3 Portable Tunnel — WireGuard + transparent mitm so the cabine's privacy analysis follows you anywhere (4G, public WiFi). Multi-OS install guide here.
- Network Monitoring — Real-time traffic analysis and bandwidth control
- Web Dashboard — Modern dark-themed interface accessible from any browser
- Automatic Updates — Security patches applied automatically
Quick Start
Option 1: VirtualBox (Try It Now)
Download and run in VirtualBox — no hardware required:
# Download the image
wget https://github.com/CyberMind-FR/secubox-deb/releases/latest/download/secubox-live-amd64-bookworm.img.gz
# Extract
gunzip secubox-live-amd64-bookworm.img.gz
# Create VM (requires VBoxManage)
./scripts/create-secubox-vm.sh secubox-live-amd64-bookworm.img
Access: Open https://localhost:9443 in your browser
Login: admin / secubox
Option 2: Live USB (Any PC)
Boot from USB on any x86_64 computer:
# Download
wget https://github.com/CyberMind-FR/secubox-deb/releases/latest/download/secubox-live-amd64-bookworm.img.gz
# Flash to USB (replace /dev/sdX with your USB device)
zcat secubox-live-amd64-bookworm.img.gz | sudo dd of=/dev/sdX bs=4M status=progress
Boot from USB, then access the dashboard at https://<device-ip>/
Option 3: Dedicated Hardware
For 24/7 operation, flash to dedicated hardware:
| Device | Best For | Image |
|---|---|---|
| Raspberry Pi 4/5 | Home use | secubox-rpi-arm64-*.img.gz |
| ESPRESSObin | Small office | secubox-espressobin-v7-*.img.gz |
| MOCHAbin | Enterprise | secubox-mochabin-*.img.gz |
| Any x86_64 PC | Repurposed hardware | secubox-live-amd64-*.img.gz |
Features
Security Dashboard
Central control panel showing system health, active threats, and quick actions.
VPN (WireGuard)
Create VPN connections with one click. Scan QR codes on mobile devices.
Intrusion Detection (CrowdSec)
Automatic threat detection and IP blocking with community threat intelligence.
Network Control
- Bandwidth management (QoS)
- Device access control
- Deep packet inspection
- Virtual hosts with SSL
System Management
- Service control
- Log viewer
- Automatic backups
- Easy updates
CTL Grammar — modular tools box
Copyright spiritual concept · Gérald Kerma · 1991
Each SecuBox module exposes its capability through three surfaces — a
web UI, a FastAPI API, and a CTL command (/usr/sbin/<module>ctl). The
CTL is the grammar of the system: each verb is a sentence addressed
to a specific layer of the operator's expressive control over their own
infrastructure.
| Layer | Verb |
|---|---|
| ROUTING | haproxyctl vhost add/remove |
| INTERCEPTION | mitmproxyctl route add/remove/list |
| REPLICATION | giteactl repo mirror add/remove |
| IDENTITY | giteactl user add/remove |
| CI EXECUTION | giteactl runner add/remove/list |
| PUBLISHING | publishctl post / dropletctl publish / metablogizerctl site |
| EMANCIPATE | metablogizerctl tor expose/revoke |
| HOSTING | streamlitctl app deploy/.../info |
| DEV WORKBENCH | streamforgectl project create/.../templates |
| OPS MONITORING | healthctl check/list/status/alert |
Composing the verbs expresses end-to-end workflows in three lines of
shell. See docs/grammar.md for the conceptual
frame and the layered architecture map.
To add a 9th verb, follow HOWTO-grammar.md —
the six-step recipe takes about an hour for a Bash CTL.
Eye Remote — External Dashboard
A standalone round display that connects to SecuBox via USB OTG, showing real-time metrics with a cyberpunk 3D visualization.
| Feature | Description |
|---|---|
| Hardware | Raspberry Pi Zero W + HyperPixel 2.1 Round (480×480) |
| Connection | USB OTG composite gadget (network + serial) |
| Display | 3D rotating cube + rainbow ring metrics |
| Metrics | CPU, Memory, Disk, Temperature, WiFi RSSI |
Quick Start
# Download Eye Remote image
wget https://github.com/CyberMind-FR/secubox-deb/releases/download/v2.2.1-eye-remote/secubox-eye-remote-2.2.1.img.xz
# Flash to SD card
xzcat secubox-eye-remote-2.2.1.img.xz | sudo dd of=/dev/sdX bs=4M status=progress
- Insert SD in Pi Zero W with HyperPixel display
- Connect USB DATA port (middle) to SecuBox
- Dashboard appears automatically (~60s boot)
SSH: pi@10.55.0.2 (password: raspberry)
📖 Full documentation: remote-ui/round/README.md
Default Credentials
| Service | Username | Password |
|---|---|---|
| Web Dashboard | admin |
secubox |
| SSH | root |
secubox |
Change these immediately after first login!
Support
- Wiki: github.com/CyberMind-FR/secubox-deb/wiki
- Issues: github.com/CyberMind-FR/secubox-deb/issues
- Email: support@secubox.in
License
CMSD-1.0 (CyberMind Source-Disclosed License) © 2026 CyberMind · Gérald Kerma See LICENCE-CMSD-1.0.md for terms.
Technical Reference (Click to Expand)
Architecture
OpenWrt / LuCI → Debian bookworm
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
RPCD shell backend → FastAPI + Uvicorn (Unix socket)
UCI config /etc/config/ → TOML /etc/secubox/secubox.conf
luci-app-*/htdocs/ (JS/CSS/HTML) → Conservé + XHR réécrits
OpenWrt packages (.ipk) → Paquets Debian (.deb)
opkg → apt + repo apt.secubox.in
Supported Hardware
| Board | SoC | RAM | Network | Profile |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MOCHAbin | Armada 7040 Quad 1.8GHz | 4 GB | 2× SFP+ 10GbE + 4× GbE | Pro |
| ESPRESSObin v7 | Armada 3720 Dual 1.2GHz | 1–2 GB | WAN + 2× LAN DSA | Lite |
| ESPRESSObin Ultra | Armada 3720 Dual 1.2GHz | 2 GB | WAN PoE + 4× LAN + Wi-Fi | Lite+ |
| Raspberry Pi 4/400 | BCM2711 Quad 1.5-1.8GHz | 2-8 GB | GbE + USB | Lite |
| Raspberry Pi 5 | BCM2712 Quad 2.4GHz | 4-8 GB | GbE + USB | Full |
| VM x86_64 | Any | 2+ GB | Virtio/NAT | Full |
Packages (126 modules)
Core: secubox-core, secubox-hub, secubox-portal, secubox-system
Security: secubox-crowdsec, secubox-wireguard, secubox-auth, secubox-nac, secubox-waf, secubox-users
Network: secubox-netmodes, secubox-dpi, secubox-qos, secubox-vhost, secubox-haproxy
Monitoring: secubox-netdata, secubox-mediaflow, secubox-cdn
DNS/Email: secubox-dns, secubox-mail, secubox-webmail
Publishing: secubox-droplet, secubox-streamlit, secubox-metablogizer, secubox-publish
API Reference
All modules expose REST APIs at /api/v1/<module>/
# Login
curl -X POST https://localhost/api/v1/portal/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"secubox"}'
# Use token
curl https://localhost/api/v1/hub/status \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <token>'
Key Endpoints:
GET /api/v1/hub/dashboard— Dashboard dataGET /api/v1/crowdsec/decisions— Active bansPOST /api/v1/crowdsec/ban— Ban IPGET /api/v1/wireguard/peers— VPN peersGET /api/v1/wireguard/qrcode/{peer}— Peer QR code
Configuration
Main config: /etc/secubox/secubox.conf (TOML)
[general]
hostname = "secubox"
timezone = "Europe/Paris"
[auth]
jwt_secret = "your-secret-key"
session_timeout = 86400
[network]
wan_interface = "eth0"
lan_interface = "eth1"
Development
# Setup
bash setup-dev.sh && source .venv/bin/activate
# Run module API
cd packages/secubox-crowdsec
uvicorn api.main:app --reload --port 8001
# Build package
dpkg-buildpackage -us -uc -b
# Build image
sudo bash image/build-image.sh --board vm-x64 --vdi
UI Design Guidelines
Color Palette (Cyberpunk/Hermetic):
| Variable | Color | Usage |
|---|---|---|
--cosmos-black |
#0a0a0f |
Background |
--gold-hermetic |
#c9a84c |
Accents, titles |
--cinnabar |
#e63946 |
Alerts, errors |
--matrix-green |
#00ff41 |
Success |
--void-purple |
#6e40c9 |
Links |
--cyber-cyan |
#00d4ff |
Info, hover |
--text-primary |
#e8e6d9 |
Main text |
Typography: Cinzel (titles), IM Fell English (body), JetBrains Mono (code)