diff --git a/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/main.go b/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/main.go
index 86af2c74..009ec9bc 100644
--- a/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/main.go
+++ b/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/main.go
@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ type Server struct {
 	// Nil means no ban tracking (legacy: plain 403 on WAF hit).
 	ban *Ban
 
+	// escalateBan counts hits on `escalate`-mode categories in a SEPARATE
+	// sliding window (long, e.g. 24h) from `ban`. escalate observes (passes,
+	// logs "detect") until this counter says banned, then bans via crowdsec.
+	// Nil means escalate behaves like detect (observe, never ban).
+	escalateBan *Ban
+
 	// threatLog appends one JSON line per WAF hit to the threats log file.
 	// Wired in main() via NewThreatLog(--threat-log); tests can inject.
 	// Nil means no threat logging.
@@ -407,6 +413,36 @@ func (s *Server) handler() http.Handler {
 					}
 					hit = false // fall through to the normal proxy path
 				}
+				if hit && mode == modeEscalate {
+					// Observe first, ban a persistent scanner. Uses a SEPARATE
+					// counter (escalateBan) so probes for absent products never
+					// mix with the block-mode ban signal. Self-contained: it does
+					// NOT fall through to the block path below, which would double
+					// count into s.ban.
+					if s.escalateBan == nil {
+						// No counter → observe like detect, never ban.
+						s.logEscalate(r, ip, rawPath, cat, sev, "detect")
+						hit = false
+					} else if count, banned := s.escalateBan.Record(ip, time.Now().Unix()); banned {
+						// Threshold crossed: ban for real, exactly as the block
+						// path's ban branch does — but gated on escalateBan.
+						s.logEscalate(r, ip, rawPath, cat, sev, "banned")
+						// Mirror the block path's journald line so an operator
+						// tailing `journalctl -u secubox-waf-ng` for THREAT sees
+						// escalate bans too — otherwise a banned scanner is
+						// visible in the dashboard JSON but silent in the logs.
+						log.Printf("sbxwaf: THREAT [%s] %s (escalate %d): %s", sev, ip, count, cat)
+						if s.crowdsec != nil {
+							go s.crowdsec.Report(ip, cat, sev)
+						}
+						writeBan(w)
+						return
+					} else {
+						// Still observing: log and let it through.
+						s.logEscalate(r, ip, rawPath, cat, sev, "detect")
+						hit = false
+					}
+				}
 				if hit {
 					// Task 3.2 — graduated WARNING/BAN response.
 					//
@@ -539,6 +575,25 @@ func (s *Server) handler() http.Handler {
 	})
 }
 
+// logEscalate writes one threat record for an escalate-mode hit. `action` is
+// "detect" while observing and "banned" once the threshold is crossed.
+func (s *Server) logEscalate(r *http.Request, ip, rawPath, cat, sev, action string) {
+	if s.threatLog == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	s.threatLog.Record(ThreatRecord{
+		ClientIP: ip,
+		Host:     r.Host,
+		Method:   r.Method,
+		Path:     rawPath,
+		Category: cat,
+		Severity: sev,
+		RuleID:   "",
+		Action:   action,
+		UA:       r.Header.Get("User-Agent"),
+	})
+}
+
 // parseTrustedHosts parses a comma-separated list of hostnames into a set.
 // Empty entries are silently skipped.
 func parseTrustedHosts(csv string) map[string]struct{} {
@@ -634,6 +689,13 @@ func main() {
 	wafSkipHosts := flag.String("waf-skip-hosts",
 		"git.gk2.secubox.in,git.secubox.in,admin.gk2.secubox.in,10.100.0.1:9080",
 		"comma-separated hostnames to bypass WAF inspection entirely (mirrors Python trusted-host list)")
+	// escalate mode: separate long-window counter (a slow scanner probing over
+	// hours/days must still trip a ban even though each individual probe is
+	// only observed, not blocked).
+	escalateWindow := flag.Duration("escalate-window", 24*time.Hour,
+		"sliding window for escalate-mode categories (a slow scanner needs a long window)")
+	escalateThreshold := flag.Int("escalate-threshold", 3,
+		"probes within the escalate window before an IP is banned")
 	flag.Parse()
 
 	// rules is consumed below when --rules is provided.
@@ -679,6 +741,8 @@ func main() {
 		// Task 3.2: graduated ban (window=300s, threshold=3, matches Python
 		// BAN_WINDOW=300 / BAN_THRESHOLD=3 from secubox_waf.py lines 82-83).
 		ban: NewBan(300*time.Second, 3),
+		// escalate mode: separate long-window counter (default 24h/3).
+		escalateBan: NewBan(*escalateWindow, *escalateThreshold),
 		// Task 3.2: append-only threat log.
 		threatLog: NewThreatLog(*threatLog),
 		// crowdsec: wired below when --crowdsec-url and --crowdsec-jwt-file are set.
diff --git a/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/main_test.go b/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/main_test.go
index 9dec9fc8..6c8a4a80 100644
--- a/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/main_test.go
+++ b/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/main_test.go
@@ -298,6 +298,134 @@ func TestAbsentModeStillBlocks(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// ─── escalate mode (Task 2) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+// escalate observes the first N-1 probes: they PASS (like detect) and do NOT
+// ban. Only the Nth probe from the same IP bans.
+func TestEscalateObservesThenBansAtThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	rulesPath := writeRulesFile(t, `{"probes":{"name":"P","severity":"high","mode":"escalate",
+		"patterns":[{"id":"f5-1","pattern":"/mgmt/tm/util/bash","desc":"F5 probe"}]}}`)
+
+	backendHits := 0
+	backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		backendHits++
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	defer backend.Close()
+
+	s := newDetectTestServer(t, backend.URL, rulesPath)
+	s.escalateBan = NewBan(time.Hour, 3) // threshold 3
+	handler := s.handler()
+
+	// Probes 1 and 2: observed, pass through, backend reached.
+	for i := 1; i <= 2; i++ {
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(rec, detectTestReq("203.0.113.60"))
+		if rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden {
+			t.Fatalf("probe %d: got 403, escalate must observe (pass) before the threshold", i)
+		}
+	}
+	if backendHits != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 observed probes to reach the backend, got %d", backendHits)
+	}
+	if s.escalateBan.Count("203.0.113.60") < 2 {
+		t.Fatal("escalate did not count the observed probes")
+	}
+
+	// Probe 3: threshold reached → ban (403).
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, detectTestReq("203.0.113.60"))
+	if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("probe 3 (threshold): got %d, want 403 (ban)", rec.Code)
+	}
+}
+
+// escalate must NOT touch the block counter (s.ban): the two signals are
+// separate. Probing an escalate category must not advance s.ban.
+func TestEscalateUsesItsOwnCounterNotTheBlockBan(t *testing.T) {
+	rulesPath := writeRulesFile(t, `{"probes":{"name":"P","severity":"high","mode":"escalate",
+		"patterns":[{"id":"f5-1","pattern":"/mgmt/tm/util/bash","desc":"F5 probe"}]}}`)
+	backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	defer backend.Close()
+
+	s := newDetectTestServer(t, backend.URL, rulesPath)
+	s.escalateBan = NewBan(time.Hour, 3)
+	handler := s.handler()
+
+	handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), detectTestReq("203.0.113.61"))
+	handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), detectTestReq("203.0.113.61"))
+
+	if s.ban != nil && s.ban.Count("203.0.113.61") != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("escalate advanced the block counter s.ban (%d); the counters must be separate",
+			s.ban.Count("203.0.113.61"))
+	}
+	if s.escalateBan.Count("203.0.113.61") != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("escalate counter = %d, want 2", s.escalateBan.Count("203.0.113.61"))
+	}
+}
+
+// With no escalate counter, an escalate category behaves like detect: it
+// observes and never bans — never like block.
+func TestEscalateWithNilCounterBehavesLikeDetect(t *testing.T) {
+	rulesPath := writeRulesFile(t, `{"probes":{"name":"P","severity":"high","mode":"escalate",
+		"patterns":[{"id":"f5-1","pattern":"/mgmt/tm/util/bash","desc":"F5 probe"}]}}`)
+	reached := false
+	backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		reached = true
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	defer backend.Close()
+
+	s := newDetectTestServer(t, backend.URL, rulesPath)
+	s.escalateBan = nil // no counter
+	handler := s.handler()
+
+	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(rec, detectTestReq("203.0.113.62"))
+		if rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden {
+			t.Fatalf("nil escalate counter must observe (pass), never ban; got 403 on probe %d", i+1)
+		}
+	}
+	if !reached {
+		t.Fatal("nil escalate counter: request was swallowed")
+	}
+}
+
+// The ban at threshold logs action="banned" (counted as a block); the observed
+// probes log action="detect" (excluded from the block counters).
+func TestEscalateLogsDetectWhileObservingAndBannedAtThreshold(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	logPath := filepath.Join(dir, "threats.jsonl")
+	rulesPath := writeRulesFile(t, `{"probes":{"name":"P","severity":"high","mode":"escalate",
+		"patterns":[{"id":"f5-1","pattern":"/mgmt/tm/util/bash","desc":"F5 probe"}]}}`)
+	backend := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+	defer backend.Close()
+
+	s := newDetectTestServer(t, backend.URL, rulesPath)
+	s.escalateBan = NewBan(time.Hour, 2) // threshold 2 for a short test
+	s.threatLog = NewThreatLog(logPath)
+	handler := s.handler()
+
+	handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), detectTestReq("203.0.113.63")) // observe → "detect"
+	handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), detectTestReq("203.0.113.63")) // threshold → "banned"
+
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(logPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("threat log not written: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"detect"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("observed probe must log action=detect, got: %s", raw)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(string(raw), `"banned"`) {
+		t.Fatalf("threshold probe must log action=banned, got: %s", raw)
+	}
+}
+
 // The threat record must say "detect" — otherwise stats conflate "blocked" with
 // "would have blocked" and the 198k threat counter becomes a lie.
 func TestDetectModeLogsActionDetect(t *testing.T) {
diff --git a/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/rules.go b/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/rules.go
index 2f78e943..9ca5da88 100644
--- a/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/rules.go
+++ b/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/rules.go
@@ -69,12 +69,17 @@ import (
 //	modeDetect — a match is counted and logged, the request PASSES, and nothing
 //	             is banned. Lets an operator try a rule against real traffic
 //	             before arming it.
+//	modeEscalate — a match is observed first; after N occurrences from the same
+//	              source within a time window, the source is banned. Intermediate
+//	              protection: observe persistent scanners, block them, but allow
+//	              transient false positives.
 //
 // A category with no "mode" is modeBlock. A detect default would silently turn
 // the whole WAF into an observer — a mute security outage.
 const (
-	modeBlock  = "block"
-	modeDetect = "detect"
+	modeBlock    = "block"
+	modeDetect   = "detect"
+	modeEscalate = "escalate"
 )
 
 // compiledPattern holds a compiled regex and its metadata.
@@ -210,11 +215,11 @@ func loadRulesJSON(path string) *rulesData {
 		mode := modeBlock
 		if cat.Mode != nil && *cat.Mode != "" {
 			switch *cat.Mode {
-			case modeBlock, modeDetect:
+			case modeBlock, modeDetect, modeEscalate:
 				mode = *cat.Mode
 			default:
-				log.Printf("sbxwaf/rules: category %q has unknown mode %q — falling back to %q (known modes: %q, %q)",
-					catID, *cat.Mode, modeBlock, modeBlock, modeDetect)
+				log.Printf("sbxwaf/rules: category %q has unknown mode %q — falling back to %q (known modes: %q, %q, %q)",
+					catID, *cat.Mode, modeBlock, modeBlock, modeDetect, modeEscalate)
 			}
 		}
 
diff --git a/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/rules_test.go b/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/rules_test.go
index bceac654..5707ab8f 100644
--- a/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/rules_test.go
+++ b/packages/secubox-toolbox-ng/cmd/sbxwaf/rules_test.go
@@ -414,3 +414,26 @@ func TestEnabledFalseWinsOverMode(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("disabled category must not match")
 	}
 }
+
+func TestModeEscalateIsParsed(t *testing.T) {
+	p := writeRulesFile(t, `{"probes":{"name":"Absent-product probes","severity":"high","mode":"escalate",
+		"patterns":[{"id":"f5-1","pattern":"/mgmt/tm/util/bash","desc":"F5 RCE probe"}]}}`)
+	if got := catMode(LoadRules(p), "probes"); got != modeEscalate {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q, want %q", got, modeEscalate)
+	}
+}
+
+// escalate must be a first-class known mode — an unknown value still fails
+// closed to block, and "escalate" must NOT be treated as unknown.
+func TestModeEscalateIsNotTreatedAsUnknown(t *testing.T) {
+	p := writeRulesFile(t, `{"probes":{"name":"P","mode":"escalate",
+		"patterns":[{"id":"f5-1","pattern":"/mgmt/tm/util/bash","desc":"x"}]}}`)
+	r := LoadRules(p)
+	if got := catMode(r, "probes"); got == modeBlock {
+		t.Fatal("escalate fell through to block — it must be recognised, not treated as an unknown value")
+	}
+	// The category is still evaluated (a probe hits).
+	if _, _, _, hit := r.Match("GET", "/mgmt/tm/util/bash", "", "", ""); !hit {
+		t.Fatal("escalate category was dropped")
+	}
+}